

Labour Market Statistics, January 2022

18 January 2022

This briefing note sets out analysis of the Labour Market Statistics published this morning. The analysis draws on **Labour Force Survey (LFS)** data, which is the main household survey that collects official figures on employment, unemployment and economic inactivity and the **ONS Vacancy Survey**, which collects employer data on open vacancies. The LFS data covers the period September to November 2021, so either side of the end of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme but before the emergence of the Omicron variant; while the Vacancy Survey includes data up to December 2021 (and so may reflect some early impacts from Omicron).

In addition this month, we have included an [Annex](#) to the briefing that sets out the differences between LFS estimates of employment and those reported through the monthly 'Pay As You Earn Real Time Information' data.

Summary

Today's figures are very disappointing overall – with employment growth appearing to have stalled, and falling unemployment offset by further rises in 'economic inactivity' (the measure of those not looking and/ or not available for work). Employment remains 600 thousand below pre-pandemic levels while economic inactivity is 400 thousand higher.

This growth in inactivity is increasingly being driven by higher worklessness due to ill health, which is up around 200 thousand in the last six months (and by 230 thousand since the pandemic began). It is also rising for young people outside full time education, and falls in labour force participation have been particularly large for older people. In all there are now 1.1 million fewer people in the labour force than we would have expected to see based on pre-crisis trends, and older people account for three fifths of this 'participation gap'.

This flatlining employment is happening despite continued record levels of vacancies, which do not appear to have been affected much at all either by the end of furlough or the onset of Omicron. Vacancies are up across all industries, and further falls in unemployment mean that there are now just 1.1 unemployed people per vacancy – comfortably (yet again) the tightest labour market in at least fifty years.

These problems in the labour market have been evident (and reported on) for at least six months now and our continued failure to take steps to address them is holding back our recovery from the pandemic. It is particularly pressing given the costs of living crisis, which will hit those out of work particularly hard. The Plan for Jobs has averted an unemployment catastrophe, but we need a new ‘Plan for Participation’ that can mobilise government, employers and those services that work with people who are out of work, to help those who can work and who may want to work to get back in.

Finally, in the attached [Annex](#) we set our concerns around the continued reliance on PAYE Real Time Information data as the leading indicator of the state of the labour market. This experimental statistic only gives a partial view of total employment, tells us nothing about those out of work, and the more timely ‘flash’ estimates are subject to wild revision (with the monthly flash estimates during 2021 alone being revised down by on average 110 thousand). We would therefore urge users to take the PAYE data with a large pinch of salt, and would urge government and the ONS to lead with the (official) Labour Force Survey estimates.

The employment recovery has stalled, with ‘economic inactivity’ rising even as unemployment falls

Today’s figures are overall very worrying, with employment unchanged on recent months and ‘economic inactivity’ – the measure of those not looking for work and/ or not available for work – inching up, despite continued very high vacancies and a recovery in demand.

The published employment rate estimate, of 75.5%, is exactly the same as the figure published last month and only 0.2 percentage points up on the previous quarter. Employment remains 600 thousand lower than before the pandemic began (a slightly larger gap than was reported last month). At the same time, unemployment continues to drift down – reaching 4.1% today, which is close to the pre-crisis rate, which in turn was its lowest since the early 1970s. This conundrum of both lower employment and lower unemployment is explained by continued rises in economic inactivity, which started to fall back through the early summer but now appears to be rising again – and overall is 410 thousand higher than it was before the pandemic began.

These trends are set out in Figure 1 below, which shows the single month estimates for the main rates (yellow) and the quarterly averages that then flow from these (in blue). Figure 2 then shows changes in the levels of employment, unemployment and economic inactivity over the last quarter (yellow), the previous eighteen months since the start of the pandemic (blue) and overall (black dots).

This recent growth in inactivity could be explained by one of three factors (or a combination of all three):

- More people moving from unemployment into economic inactivity as they give up on finding a job – which could in turn explain part of the recent falls in unemployment (and long-term unemployment, explored later in the briefing);

- More moving from employment straight into economic inactivity – for example at the end of the furlough scheme, which coincides with this period and would be consistent in particular with higher inactivity for older people; or perhaps due to illness (either at the end of or in place of sick leave, which is classed as being ‘in work’) which would be consistent with the growth in economic inactivity due to ill health; and/ or
- Fewer people who were already economically inactive moving into work (or unemployment) – for example because of underlying health conditions and/ or concerns about the virus.


We should get a better idea of the relative weight of those three factors in next month’s release, which will include estimates of ‘flows’ between employment, unemployment and economic inactivity – so watch this space.

Figure 1: Employment, unemployment and economic inactivity rates (16-64) – quarterly average with single-month estimates



Source: Labour Force Survey

Figure 2: Changes in employment, unemployment and economic inactivity: first eighteen months of the pandemic (Dec-Feb 2020 to Jun-Aug 2021) and most recent quarter (Jun-Aug 2021 to Sep-Nov 2021)



Source: Labour Force Survey

Higher worklessness is being driven now by ill health and early retirement

Economic inactivity has been rising throughout the pandemic, but the reasons for that rise have changed as the crisis has evolved. Figure 3 illustrates this, showing the contribution since the onset of the pandemic of each of the seven potential 'reasons' for economic inactivity that are recorded in the Labour Force Survey (as coloured bars), and the total change in economic inactivity (as a line)¹. This shows that there have been three distinct phases, with:


- Economic inactivity growing through the first lockdown due to 'other' reasons – the light blue bars – which would have been people either not going into work because of fears around the virus/ the unavailability of work, and/ or people leaving work because of restrictions (and not being protected by furlough or having a job to go back to – which continued to be counted as employed). This growth peaked at 350 thousand but has now fallen back to 160 thousand above pre-pandemic levels.

¹ Many thanks to Matt Whittaker at Pro Bono Economics, who first published this [chart last month](#).

- A large growth in student numbers – the pink bar – particularly from summer 2020 as young people chose to stay on in education rather than take their chances in the labour market. At its highest earlier this year, there were 400 thousand more people economically inactive due to studying than pre-pandemic, but this has now fallen back to 190 thousand more (with part of that fall explained by more students also working, and so being counted as employed).
- More recently, and particularly since spring 2021, strong growth in those out of work due to ill health – long-term ill health in blue, short term in yellow. Combined, this is now 230 thousand above pre-pandemic, compared with just 20 thousand in April-June 2021. As noted above, this does not include people who are still in work but off sick – so is either people who have got ill and left work entirely, or people who were already ill and are unable to return to work.

Across the second and third phases above, we have also seen large falls in the number of people out of work for caring reasons, predominantly women and likely to mainly reflect more mothers being in work – either being more likely to stay in work, perhaps because of the measures to protect jobs, or more likely to enter work perhaps due to other changes in the household (for example a partner losing income).

Figure 3: Changes in economic inactivity since start of pandemic (December-February 2020), by reason for inactivity and overall




Source: Labour Force Survey

These very large, recent rises in economic inactivity due to ill health are very concerning, and mean that for only the second time in a decade this is the most common reason for being out of work and not looking for work (and the only other time that this has happened

was for a single quarter at the start of the pandemic). These changes in the overall reasons for economic inactivity are set out in Figure 4 below.


Figure 4: Reasons for economic inactivity



Source: Labour Force Survey

Of further concern, and as we reported [last month](#), the number of young people not in full time education nor in employment also appears to be rising again, after falls earlier in the year. This is shown in Figure 5 below. Overall 9.1% of all young people are economically inactive and not in full time education, the highest since May-July 2020. At the same time, just 4.2% of all young people are unemployed and not in full time education, which is a new record low (edging down from 4.3% in last month’s figures). These two changes may be linked – i.e. part of the growth in economic inactivity may be due to people moving from unemployment – but it could also be the case that those young people who are looking for work are able to find it even as more young people leave the labour market entirely.


Figure 5: Proportion of all young people (16-24) who are not in full-time education and either unemployed or economically inactive



Source: Labour Force Survey

This participation crisis looks even worse compared with the pre-crisis trend – especially for older people

The large falls in employment since the onset of the crisis have come off the back of thirty years of strong growth in labour market participation – that is, the number of people either in work or actively seeking work (i.e. unemployed). As Figure 6 shows, this rising tide in the labour market has continue through thick and thin, recession and recovery, until the onset of the pandemic. This means that the ‘participation gap’ between current economic activity and what would have happened had pre-crisis trends continued now stands at 1.1 million. And with both employment and unemployment down, this gap has widened from 1.0 million in last month’s briefing.

Figure 6: Level of economic activity – actual and if pre-crisis trend had continued

Source: Labour Force Survey and IES estimates


As with previous months, Figure 7 then breaks this participation gap down by age and gender, and by how far it is explained by a smaller population (blue bars) or by higher economic inactivity (yellow bars) – i.e. a negative change in the blue bar is a *lower* than expected population, while a positive change in the yellow bar is a *higher* than expected level of economic inactivity. The total change in activity levels is therefore the blue bar minus the yellow bar, and is illustrated by the black dots.

This shows that overall, just over one third (38%) of the change in activity is explained by a smaller population, while the remainder (62%) is explained by higher economic inactivity. Lower population will reflect both lower net migration (than pre-crisis trends) and demographic changes, which could include the impact of excess deaths due to Covid-19.

Looking specifically at economic inactivity, the graph brings out clearly that this is being driven by higher levels among older people in particular than pre-crisis trends (57% of the total participation gap), and particularly for older women (who historically also had lower employment than men). The economic inactivity gap for older people overall is now 630 thousand, compared with 530 thousand reported last month.

Participation is also lower than pre-crisis trends for younger people, driven particularly by more young people staying in education; while for those aged 25-39, lower participation is driven by lower population (i.e. net migration) more than economic inactivity – although more detailed analysis suggests that both men and women aged 25-39 have seen inactivity due to ill health increase, with offsetting falls for women in those economically inactive due to caring responsibilities.

Figure 7: Changes in economic inactivity and population by age and gender, compared with pre-crisis trend




Source: IES estimates based on Labour Force Survey

Yet again, this crisis comes despite record demand for workers – meaning an ever tighter jobs market

The significant falls in labour force participation and rising economic inactivity are even more concerning given the very high levels of demand for labour. On average there were 1.25 million vacancies between October and December 2021, and even for the single month of December, when Omicron was starting to hit, there were 1.18 million openings on average. These quarterly and single month figures are shown in Figure 8 below. It seems that so far, neither the end of furlough nor the Omicron variant have had much impact, although it will take a bit more time for the impacts of the latter to become clear (although even the very latest online vacancy data from Adzuna does not suggest any significant impacts, as this [thread from Paul Bivand explains](#)). Overall, vacancies remain double the levels of this time last year, and 50% higher than the (record breaking) levels before the crisis began.


Figure 8: Vacancies – quarterly and single-month estimates



Source: ONS Vacancy Survey


We also continue to see vacancies above pre-crisis levels in every single industrial category (Figure 9), with again health, social care, hospitality and “professional” jobs (like law, accountancy, engineering and science) leading the way. Some of this growth, particularly in hospitality, reflects problems in getting the right people into the right jobs as restrictions have eased and furlough ended, but some too will clearly reflect higher demand in the economy – with the latest GDP figures showing that we are now back to pre-crisis levels of output (but with different patterns of output and without pre-crisis levels of employment).

Figure 9: Vacancies by industry, pre-crisis and latest data



Source: ONS Vacancy Survey

Again as with previous months, very high vacancies plus very low unemployment means a very, very tight labour market. The number of unemployed people per vacancy is now even lower than the lows it reached in recent months, hitting 1.1, compared with 1.2 last month and 1.3 the month before (and 4.1 during the depths of the crisis). Figure 10 shows this for the last two decades, while last month’s briefing shows that the ratio has never been this low in at least fifty years. This participation crisis is holding back growth, contributing to shortages and in time may also push up inflation.

Figure 10: Unemployed people per vacancy (exc. Agriculture, forestry and fishing)

Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Vacancy Survey


In better news, long-term unemployment is levelling off, and falling for young people

More positively, long-term unemployment appears to now be levelling off for people aged 25 and over (where we define this as unemployment of twelve months or more) and is back to pre-crisis levels for young people (where we define it as six months or more). Figure 11 sets this out.

As noted earlier in the briefing, it is possible that part of this fall in long-term unemployment could be explained by people who were previously long-term unemployed moving into economic inactivity instead as they give up looking for work. However it should be noted that there is no increase (and indeed a decrease) in the number of people who say that they are economically inactive because they have given up looking for work (although people could of course give other reasons for not looking).

However it could also be the case that long-term unemployment is falling because more people have left long-term unemployment for work than have moved from short-term to long-term unemployment. In our view this is the more likely explanation, given the significant focus through the Plan for Jobs and wider measures on supporting the unemployed, and given the very strong recovery in labour demand. However more work is needed to understand these flows.


Figure 11: Long-term unemployment by age



Source: Labour Force Survey. Long-term unemployment is defined as unemployment of more than six months for young people, or more than twelve months for those aged 25 and over.

While redundancies continue to flatline

Finally, the latest redundancy data confirm that the furlough scheme has had no discernible impact on redundancies. Redundancies in the LFS are down again, while the latest data on redundancy notifications to the Insolvency Service (via HR1 forms) is also down. The weekly LFS estimates through to the end of November also suggest continued falls in redundancies, to levels well below even those we were seeing before the pandemic began (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Whether made redundant in the last three months – weekly estimates, January 2020 to November 2021

Source: Labour Force Survey weekly estimates

Conclusion

Despite the headlines of record (PAYE) employment and falling unemployment, in our view there is no escaping the fact that today's figures were very weak and point to a labour market recovery that was stalling before the Omicron variant hit, even while economic demand overall was bouncing back strongly. This weak recovery is being driven by large falls in labour market participation, which are even bigger when compared with pre-crisis trends. These are being driven particularly by fewer older people in the labour force, more people out of work due to ill health, and more young people outside of education and work. These problems are not new, and have been evident in the data – and in these briefing notes – for six months now. Nor will these issues go away on their own, and the longer we hold off taking action to address them the greater the problems for employers, for our recovery from the pandemic, and for those out of work (not least with inflation set to breach 5%).

In our view, the Plan for Jobs succeeded in preventing an unemployment catastrophe over the last year, but the measures that are in the Plan are not going to be enough to address the challenges that we now face and support those who are out of work and often not looking for a job. So we need a new Plan for Participation, that will extend our public employment services and support to all of those who are out of work and want help – not just those on the right bit of benefit – and that can focus on working better with older people, health services, social and childcare, local partners, welfare services and employers.

The good news though is that with unemployment far lower forecast there is almost certainly funding already committed and services commissioned which could be put towards these ends – with the Autumn Budget and Spending Review allocating nearly £10 billion to the Department for Work and Pensions alone for employment services and support.

Employers too will need to do more and work better – through more inclusive recruitment, better job design (particularly around shift notice, patterns and flexibility), improved induction and in-work training, and workplace support with health, caring and wider needs.

Annex: Understanding the differences between the LFS and Pay As You Earn Real Time Information data

The ONS has published monthly data on the earnings and employment from the ‘Pay As You Earn’ system since 2019. This PAYE data provides estimates of the number of paid employees, drawn from administrative (HM Revenue and Customs) records. The release also includes a ‘flash’ estimate for employee numbers one month prior to the date of publication, so for example this month’s flash estimate covers December 2021. This means that overall, the PAYE data provides more timely estimates than the LFS, based on a larger sample, but only covering those paid through PAYE.

Historically, the ONS’s monthly [Labour Market Overviews](#) led with reporting of the Labour Force Survey indicators. However since June 2020, these Overviews have led with the PAYE estimates on the basis that these provide more timely data on labour market changes. This in turn has meant that the reporting of jobs data in the press and by Ministers has tended to focus on the PAYE measure. We (and some others) have said for some time that the PAYE data is not a good yardstick for understanding the labour market overall, and so this Annex tries to explain what the data does tell us, how this can be reconciled with the LFS, and some of the issues with relying too much on it.

Why do the PAYE and LFS data tell different stories?


As noted, the PAYE data are an estimate of those individuals paid by employers through the Pay As You Earn system. The Labour Force Survey by contrast estimates all of those in employment, and so includes those who are self-employed and not paid through Pay as You Earn². Since the start of the PAYE dataset in 2014 there have been on average around 4.7 million people self-employed, and so the *overall estimate* for the number of people in work is higher in the LFS than in the PAYE data. However, this difference has on average been *lower* than 4.7 million, at around 3.9 million. In other words, the PAYE figures are on average 800 thousand higher than the estimate for employee numbers in the LFS.

Estimates of PAYE employment and LFS employees are shown in Figure 13 below. This compares quarterly averages for PAYE employment and for LFS employees over the same rolling three month periods, so the most recent data cover the period September–November 2021. This figure shows that PAYE estimates have always been significantly higher than those in the LFS, and that this difference was more than one million pre-pandemic. There are likely to be a number of reasons for this, which are explored in [this 2019 ONS article](#). A small part of the difference will be due to differences in coverage, and in particular that people living in ‘communal establishments’ are counted in PAYE but not LFS data (such as those in university halls of residence; living in defence bases, care

² The Labour Force Survey itself is answered by around 35,000 households each quarter, comprising 75,000 individuals.

homes, or hostels; or those in prison). [Census data](#) from 2011 suggests that this may account for 100-150 thousand employees. However the largest reason is likely to be that PAYE data includes people who may *describe* themselves as 'self-employed' in the LFS but who are in practice paid through company payrolls – either as a contractor or through their own company.

Figure 13: Estimated number of people paid through PAYE and estimated number of employees in the Labour Force Survey (rolling quarters)



Source: PAYE Real Time Information and Labour Force Survey

Figure 13 also shows that this difference between PAYE and LFS estimates was fairly consistent until the onset of the crisis, after which PAYE numbers plummeted while LFS employee numbers remained broadly flat. Since early 2021 both PAYE and LFS employee numbers have grown, and are now at their highest ever levels. This [2020 article from the ONS](#) goes some way towards explaining the different trends since the onset of the crisis. To summarise (and using the most recent data), the two most plausible reasons for why PAYE numbers fell while LFS employee numbers stayed fairly flat would appear to be:

- **People who had a job to go back to but were not being paid continued to be counted as 'in work' in the LFS but not in the PAYE data.** On average, between April and December 2020, the LFS estimated that 320 thousand employees at any one time were away from work but not being paid.
- **Some people who had previously described themselves as self-employed in the LFS are now identifying as employees,** perhaps because they had been furloughed and so were now clearer about their employment status/ relationship. In total, 360 thousand more people moved from self-employment into employee work in 2020 than

in 2019, while the ONS points out that the number of self-employed people who reported having changed jobs has remained broadly the same as pre-pandemic.

So if these two factors *do* explain the difference in trends between the LFS and PAYE data, then the PAYE data was arguably a better measure of the path of (paid) employee employment during the crisis. Interestingly, with the number of people ‘away’ from work but not being paid now back to pre-crisis levels, the gap between PAYE and LFS employee numbers has also opened up again, to around 1.0 million. This remains a few hundred thousand lower than the average gap in 2019, which could continue to be explained by people who may previously have described themselves as ‘self-employed’ now being more likely to identify as employees.

So is employment at record levels?

As noted, the PAYE data is a partial measure of total employment and so does not tell us that employment overall is at record levels. Both the PAYE and LFS employee measures are at their highest on record, but employment overall is 600 thousand lower than pre-pandemic. However, perhaps because the [ONS Labour Market Overview](#) now leads with reporting on the PAYE data, emphasises its position relative to pre-pandemic levels (and does not state elsewhere that the LFS measure is below pre-pandemic levels) there is often widespread reporting that employment has set new records.

A further complicating factor is the impact of changes to ‘off payroll working rules’ (known as the [IR35 changes](#)) which came into effect in Spring 2021. These changes mean that in most cases, employers³ are now liable for establishing the correct tax treatment of contractors. This has led to more people being paid through company payrolls – and therefore PAYE – who would previously have been engaged as self-employed contractors. The precise impact of this on the PAYE and LFS data are not known, but it is plausible that the changes may have led to people who would previously have classified themselves as self-employed *both* moving into PAYE *and* describing themselves in the LFS as employees. So it could be that part of the rises in both the LFS and PAYE data are in effect reclassification. Perhaps more to the point though, the precise scale of these changes (and other definitional issues) only matter because a partial measure of employment – PAYE – has become the primary indicator used in reporting on the state of the labour market.

Are the ‘flash’ estimates for PAYE employment reliable?


A second issue with reliance on the PAYE data is that the more timely, ‘flash’ estimates for employment are subject to very significant revision and these revisions tend to be downward. These revisions appear to have got significantly larger in recent years:

³ Specifically, all public sector employers as well as most private sector employers with 50 or more employees.

- For the months between July 2014 and September 2019, the ‘flash estimate’ has on average been revised down by less than 4,000 compared with the latest estimate of PAYE employment for the relevant month;
- But since October 2019, the ‘flash estimate’ has on average been revised down by 86,000 compared with the latest estimate for PAYE employment in that month.

This is illustrated in Figure 14 below. Seven times in the last two years, the flash estimate has been revised down by 150 thousand or more, and once it has been revised down by at least 200 thousand.

Figure 14: Revision between initial PAYE ‘flash estimate’ and the latest available estimate of PAYE employment for that month



Source: IES analysis of PAYE Real Time Information

The reason for these large revisions is not entirely clear. It is possible that the very large revisions in recent years are a result of greater volatility in month-to-month changes in the data compared with the earlier period, as changes have been far larger during the pandemic than before. However if that is the case, then it does not explain why these problems appear to have started well before the crisis (around October 2019).


There does also appear to be some seasonality to the revisions, which may be related to tax years – with flash estimates tending to be revised *up* between April and June, and to be revised down most significantly between December and March. But again this does not explain why the revisions have got so much larger since late 2019.

Alternatively, the much larger revisions in the last two or so years may reflect problems in how the flash estimates are calculated. In particular, they are produced through a combination of actual employer returns and ‘imputation’ for where returns are missing. The imputation methodology is set out in detail in the [2019 ONS article](#), but in simple terms it:

- Assumes that some of those individuals previously paid but for whom there are no pay records in that month have actually stayed in work but not been paid in that period. This is based on historic trends and so the imputation *reduces outflows from work*.
- Assumes that there are additional (un-recorded) new starters in paid work based on those returns that have been received in time (and uses statistical techniques to try to account for any biases). So the imputation *increases inflows to work*.

Using published estimates of inflows to and outflows from PAYE employment, we can compare the ‘flash’ estimates for each month in 2021 with the latest available estimates for that month’s flows (from the data published today). The results are shown in Figure 15 below. Interestingly, they suggest that flash estimates for inflows and outflows are *both* consistently too high – i.e. both tend to be revised down – so it could well be that the methodology being used by ONS appears to impute *both* too many people starting employment in a given month *and* too few people staying in work (as the approach for outflows imputes additional stayers rather than leavers). However, the revisions for job starts are so much larger than for job exits (by on average about 60,000 a month) that flash estimates overall are consistently revised down.

Figure 15: Revision between initial PAYE ‘flash estimate’ for inflow and outflows and the latest available estimate of flows for that month



Source: IES analysis of PAYE Real Time Information

Either way, there would be value in the ONS investigating the potential reasons for these large revisions over the last few years and exploring whether it is possible to improve their accuracy. If not, and in the meantime, these issues with the reliability of the ‘flash’ estimate alone are in our view big enough to outweigh the benefits of their greater timeliness compared to the Labour Force Survey.

Conclusion

The PAYE data tells a broadly similar story to the LFS measure of employees, but with significant differences in their trends during the crisis. The PAYE data has arguably told a more accurate story during the pandemic of what happened to paid employee employment, but inevitably only gives a partial account of the state of the labour market overall – and at the moment, it is telling a very different story to the official figures, which may in turn be contributing to a perception among the public and potentially even policymakers that the labour market has recovered. At the same time, the justification for leading with the PAYE data as a more timely estimate of changes in employment is significantly undermined by the very large (and consistently downward) revisions to those estimates, which may be further contributing to a popular view that the labour market is growing strongly when it in fact may not be growing at all.

Going forward, there is clear value in the PAYE data and it is welcome that this is being published monthly and that data is regularly revised as estimates are improved. However we would argue that given the limitations in the coverage of the data and the reliability of the flash estimates, labour market briefings should lead on the official, Labour Force Survey estimates.

About IES

The Institute for Employment studies is an independent, apolitical centre of research and consultancy in employment policy and human resource management. It works with employers, government departments, agencies and professional and employee bodies to support sustained improvements in employment policy and practice.

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